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THE RISE OF THE COMMON LAW OF FEDERAL PLEADING:
IQBAL, TWOMBLY, AND THE APPLICATION
OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
HENRY S. NoYEs*
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Common Law
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense."'
-Justice Anthony Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court
"[When resolving a motion to dismiss, the court has] a question of the
meaning of a common law doctrine-namely the federal common law
doctrine of pleading in complex cases, announced in Twombly."2
-Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
I. INTRODUcrION
S INCE 1938, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FederalRules or Rules) has set the standard for how much a plaintiff must
allege at the outset of a lawsuit in order to avoid dismissal for failure to
state a claim. Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff must include in the com-
plaint "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Federal courts developed a well-settled set of principles
to apply when deciding whether to dismiss a claim. Among these princi-
ples are the following: (1) the plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as
true; (2) the court must construe the complaint liberally (in favor of the
plaintiff) and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff; (3)
the court may not consider matters or information beyond what is stated
on the face of the complaint, judicially noticed facts, and any attachments
to the complaint; (4) the complaint must provide notice to the defendant
of the plaintiffs claims and the grounds on which they rest; and (5) the
court should not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim unless it
* @ Henry S. Noyes 2011. Professor of Law, Chapman University School of
Law. I thank the Honorable Jon 0. Newman and Professors Scott Dodson and
Kevin Clermont for helpful comments on various drafts of this Article. I also am
grateful for the comments offered by my colleagues at a Chapman University
School of Law faculty workshop.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
2. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2165 (2011).
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appears beyond doubt that it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove some
set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him or her to
relief.
These principles can be summarized as: the court must accept the
vision of the world described in the plaintiffs complaint and it must view
the events that transpired in that world as the plaintiff would view them.
This concept is consistent with the adversarial litigation process we have
adopted in the United States. 3
The litigants are entitled to their day in court to present their cases to
an impartial and independent trier of fact. The trier of fact starts with an
empty frame and the parties set forth their competing versions of reality.
They recreate a past event through the submission of evidence to the trier
of fact. The theory behind the adversarial system is that placing responsi-
bility for uncovering evidence on the parties is the best way to ensure that
the trier of fact remains impartial, yet obtains all relevant evidence and the
most compelling argument in favor of each side's position. The trier of
fact accepts the universe of facts that is presented by the parties. The trier
of fact does not substitute his or her view of the world and does not sup-
plement the facts submitted by the parties, especially at the pleading stage.
Despite the fact that the trier of fact is getting an incomplete (and
sometimes erroneous) view of reality, the court does not step in and substi-
tute its own reality for that presented by the parties. As noted by Chief
Justice Roberts, a judge's job is to "call balls and strikes, and not to pitch
or bat,"4 even if the team that deserves to win is losing. In its recent deci-
sions on pleading standards, however, the Supreme Court has now asked
district courts to suit up and get in the game.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and Ashcrofl v. Iqbal,6 the Supreme
Court modified the principles that guide a district court's decision when
faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A district court
now must determine whether the claim is plausible. The Court also de-
clared that "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
3. SeeJOHNJ. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERtALS 2 (8th ed.
2001) ("The central feature of [the adversarial system] is the almost total responsi-
bility placed on the parties to the controversy for beginning suit, for shaping is-
sues, and for producing evidence; the court almost takes no active part in these
facets of the process." (emphasis omitted)).
4. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chiefjustice
of the United States, Heating Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation
Hearing]. Although there are critics of Chief Justice Roberts's analogy as imper-
fect, the criticism is focused on the description of "calling balls and strikes." See,
e.g., Theodore A. McKee, judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1709, 1711-23
(2007); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONsT.
COMMENT. 701, 702-12 (2007). None argue that a judge's job is to engage in the
game of litigation as an advocate.
5. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
[Vol. 56: p. 857858
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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." 7 Early com-
mentary assumes that the application ofjudicial experience requires a dis-
trict court to make a subjective determination of the merits of the claim
based on that judge's vision of reality.
A careful review of the meaning of "judicial experience" in the Su-
preme Court's opinions, however, refutes this understanding. Instead, the
application of judicial experience requires a district court to refer to objec-
tive information, albeit extraneous to the complaint, to inform itself of the
"truth" of the factual picture painted by the plaintiff in the complaint.
The court must consider the views of experts and commentators and the
experience of the courts as manifest through the results of earlier cases to
decide which types of claims, claimants, and factual scenarios ought to be
held to a higher pleading standard. In short, the application of judicial
experience requires the district courts to develop a common law of federal
pleading standards that will be improved and refined over time.
Although this process requires an objective determination, it permits,
and even requires, the district court to reject the vision of the world
presented by the plaintiff in the complaint. Instead, the court must view
the facts differently-either based on the results of past cases or the wis-
dom of experts and commentators on the "reality" of the situation-and
make a determination about whether the case should go forward. In other
words, the district court must suit up, become a player, and get in the
game of litigation to protect defendants and the judicial system from cases
that are not meritless, but are deemed to be objectively unworthy.
II. THE LIBERAL PLEADING STANDARD UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIIL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938. At all
times, Rule 8 has governed the "General Rules of Pleading" and estab-
lished the minimum amount that a party must allege in order to state a
claim. As originally enacted in 1938, Rule 8(a)(2) stated: "A pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain ... a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Al-
though Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been amended
three times,9 the language of Rule 8(a) (2) has remained substantially the
same. Today it states: "A pleading that states a claim for relief must con-
tain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief."' 0 The crucial language of Rule 8 has remained exactly
7. Id. at 1950.
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a) (1938) (amended 1966).
9. Rule 8 was amended on February 28, 1966, on March 2, 1987, and again on
April 28, 2007. See FED. R. Cv. P. 8.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).
859
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the same. The plaintiff must include in the complaint "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
If a plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a), the defendant
may respond by making a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted."" A complaint may be
deficient because it fails to pursue a legally recognized claim ("legal insuf-
ficiency") or because it fails to allege enough facts to state a claim ("factual
insufficiency"). 12 If the complaint suffers from legal insufficiency, the
claim will be dismissed without leave to amend.1 3 If the complaint suffers
from factual insufficiency, the plaintiffs claim will be dismissed with leave
to amend and (usually) the plaintiff will try to amend the complaint to
add additional factual allegations to state a claim for relief.
A. Principles for Application of the Liberal Pleading Standard
Over the course of more than seventy years, the Supreme Court estab-
lished and elaborated on a set of principles that a district court should
apply when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure employ a liberal pleading
standard.14
- Rule 8(a) does not require the plaintiff to allege specific
facts. 15
- A complaint is sufficient if it provides "notice" to the defen-
dant of what the plaintiffs claims are and the grounds on
which they rest. 16
- A plaintiffs factual allegations must be accepted as true.' 7
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12. See generally Wendy Gerwick Couture, Conley v. Gibson's "No Set of Facts"
Test: Neither Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. PENN STATIM 19 (2010), available
at http://pennstatelawreview.org/114/114%2OPenn%2OStatim%2019.pdf; Brad-
ley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
453 (2010).
13. See Shannon, supra note 12, at 475 ("[A] plaintiff seemingly has little
choice but to somehow convince the district court that the cause of action underly-
ing its claim, though novel, should be recognized.").
14. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("The
liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading
system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.").
15. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); see also Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("[T] he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."), abrogated by
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514
("[Pletitioner's complaint easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it
gives respondent fair notice of the basis for petitioner's claims."); Conley, 355 U.S.
at 47.
17. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) ("We review here a decision
860 [Vol. 56: p. 857
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- The court must construe the complaint liberally and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.18
- The court may not consider matters or information beyond
that stated on the face of the complaint, judicially noticed
facts, and any attachments to the complaint.19
- "In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint [the Supreme
Court] follow[s] the accepted rule that a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him to relief."20
Thus, Rule 8 establishes a liberal pleading standard that is transsub-
stantive; it applies the same to all types of claimants and across all types of
claims. Where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require heightened
pleading, the rules are explicit about the types of claims and the pleading
standard that applies. Rule 9 requires that "[i] n alleging fraud or mistake,
a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake." 2 1 Rule 9's requirement of pleading with particularity is con-
granting a motion to dismiss, and therefore must accept as true all the factual
allegations in the complaint."); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)
("What Rule 12(b) (6) does not countenance are dismissals based on ajudge's dis-
belief of a complaint's factual allegations."); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222,
225 (1955) ("The allegations of the complaint, on a motion to dismiss, must of
course be taken as true."); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 376
(1952) (holding that on motion to dismiss, courts must "admit all of the [allega-
tions] as true"); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 414 (1942)
(holding that when ruling on motion to dismiss courts must accept "the allegations
of the complaint as true").
18. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476,
481 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 657 F.3d 215 (2011); Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100,
105 (2d Cir. 2010); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1685 (2011).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) ("[C]ourts
must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordina-
rily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss, in particular, docu-
ments incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court
may take judicial notice."); Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010);
Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App'x 224, 228 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008).
20. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. As the Second Circuit noted in its Iqbal opinion,
"the 'no set of facts' language from Conley . .. has been cited by federal courts at
least 10,000 times in a wide variety of contexts." Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157
n.7 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In stating a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege the
specific facts regarding the fraud such as the identity of the person making the
fraudulent statement(s), the identity of the person to whom the fraudulent state-
ments were made, and the time, place, and nature of the fraudulent statements.
See Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1990). Rule 9(f) further provides
861
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sistent with code pleading requirements;2 2 it is inconsistent with the more
relaxed requirements of Rule 8.
Rule 8 does not establish a standard by which to evaluate the merit of
a claim or the likelihood of success of a claim.2 3 This is not to say that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are unconcerned with the merits of a
claim. The Rules employ a series of requirements and procedural devices
to ensure that a case has some merit before a plaintiff will seek to state a
claim and proceed with litigation.24 For example, Rule 11 requires a
plaintiffs attorney to "certif[y] that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances," that the claims the plaintiff asserts are warranted and that
the factual allegations currently have evidentiary support or will likely have
evidentiary support after discovery.2 5 Sanctions for filing a meritless com-
plaint that violates Rule 11 include payment of a penalty to the court or
the opposing party,2 6 "an admonition, reprimand, or censure" of the of-
fending attorney by the court,27 and referral of the matter to the state bar
association or other relevant disciplinary authorities. 28
that "[a]n allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a
pleading." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(f). But cases interpreting this provision clarify that a
plaintiff ordinarily is not required to allege in the complaint the time when or the
place where the events at issue occurred. "Rule 9(f) does not have the effect of
requiring allegations of time and place, but merely operates to make such allega-
tions, if made, material for the purposes of testing the sufficiency of the pleading as
against, for example, a motion to dismiss." Kuenzell v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 96,
99 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (citing 2 JAMEs WILLIAM MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 9.07
(1955)); see also CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1309 (Supp. 2010).
22. See Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing CHAuLEs E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 48, at 312 (2d ed. 1947)).
23. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits."); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.").
24. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Other provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)'s
simplified notice pleading standard.").
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1993).
28. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure work in tandem with various
rules of professional responsibility. For example, some states have mandatory re-
porting requirements for such sanctions. California, for one, requires that both
the sanctioned attorney and the judge issuing the monetary sanctions must report
sanctions of more than $1,000 to the State Bar. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 6068(o)(3), 6086.7(a)(3) (West 2011). The California State Bar is then obli-
gated to investigate any sanctions and determine whether to institute disciplinary
proceedings against the offending attorney. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7(c).
[Vol. 56: p. 857862
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Rule 56 permits a defendant to move for summary judgment on all or
part of a claim at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery.29
The discovery rules allow the parties to discover all of the evidence that
supports their adversary's claim.3 0 It also allows them to discover that
their adversary has no evidence, which may be the basis for a summary
judgment motion.3  Thus, a variety of Federal Rules discourage plaintiffs
from pursuing meritless claims and allow defendants to seek early resolu-
tion of meritless claims. Beyond the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
there is one significant deterrent to plaintiffs' lawyers pursuing meritless
cases. It generally does not make economic sense to pursue cases for
which there will be no financial return.32
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b)-(c); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("[C]laims
lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56.").
30. The Rules limit the scope of discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (b) (1)
(limiting scope of discovery, as matter of right, to "any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense" and providing that only upon showing of
"good cause" may additional, broader discovery be permitted by order of court). I
have written elsewhere, however, that district courts generally refuse to apply the
limitations on discovery, despite the fact that the rules have been amended repeat-
edly to constrain discovery. See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the
New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60-67 (2007). The Supreme Court
seems to agree, and its lack of faith in the ability and the willingness of judges to
control discovery costs is one of (maybe the main?) reason that it has focused its
attention on pleading standards. See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007) ("It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through
'careful case management' given the common lament that the success of judicial
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side." (citation
omitted)).
31. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (determining,
on summary judgment, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case").
32. The U.S. legal system permits (some would say encourages), however,
plaintiffs to pursue marginal cases because (as a general matter) each side bears its
own costs. A loss for a plaintiff means only a failure to recover, rather than an
obligation to reimburse a defendant's costs and attorneys' fees, and the costs of
vindication for a defendant may not make economic sense. See, e.g., Mark Ander-
son & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 20-21 (2010); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559
("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases before reaching [summary judgment] proceedings."); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) ("[A] plaintiff with a
largely groundless claim [may seek to] take up the time of a number of other
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settle-
ment value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process
will reveal relevant evidence . . . ."). Plaintiffs might file suits where they are igno-
rant of the merits, as well as suits where they know the claim is meritless. See Rob-
ert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 530-31 (1997).
863
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B. The Liberal Pleading Standard Is Consistent with the Adversarial Process
The adversarial nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a
hallmark of the American system of justice.3 3 The liberal pleading stan-
dard is "the keystone" 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is
consistent with the adversarial process of litigation, which is based on the
notion that "the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing"3 5 is the best
guarantor of a just result.3 6 Under the adversarial process, the parties
bring forth evidence to paint a picture of some event that happened in the
past. The trier of fact (judge or jury) does not independently investigate
the facts, but instead remains neutral so as to avoid reaching a premature
decision.37 Judges rely on the parties to frame the dispute and to present
evidence as they see fit.3 8
What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is ...
the presence of ajudge who does not (as an inquisitor does) con-
duct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead de-
cides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced
by the parties. ... Our system of justice is, and has always been,
an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage (even the grand
jury is an inquisitorial body), and no other disposition is
conceivable. 39
The reality that is presented to the trier of fact is necessarily incom-
plete, even by the time trial has concluded and all witnesses have testified.
First, it is an attempt to recreate an earlier event that has already hap-
pened. People change. Witnesses forget things. Witnesses and evidence
are lost over time. Some critical events are never witnessed and the parties
and the trier of fact must make educated guesses about the actual events
that unfolded. Second, the rules of evidence sometimes exclude relevant
evidence. Third, the parties regularly choose not to submit relevant evi-
dence because it is harmful to their case. Fourth, some parties do a poor
33. See generally FLEMINGJAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4 (4th ed.
1992).
34. CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 470 (5th ed.
1994); see also Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897,
1917 (1998) (describing Rule 8 as "a jewel in the crown of the Federal Rules").
35. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
36. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); see also Polk
Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that adversarial
testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.").
37. See Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, judicial Advocacy in Pro Se Litiga-
tion: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REv. 19, 42 (2009) ("[T[he greater danger is
the loosening of the well-designed constraints on the role of the judiciary in the
adversarial process. Judges are not advocates or advisors. When judges adopt
these roles, they violate deeply embedded legal principles.").
38. See Lon L. Fuller, The forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv.
353, 363-81 (1978); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old judicial Role for a New Litigation Era,
113 YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003).
39. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
[Vol. 56: p. 857864
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job and fail to present all of the evidence that is helpful to their case.
Finally, the parties, the courts, and the jurors are limited in the time that
they can devote to the issues at trial.
The liberal notice pleading standard is consistent with the adversarial
process. A district court must accept the picture that is painted by the
plaintiffs factual allegations.40 Even if the picture seems odd or counter-
intuitive, the judge does not seek out extrinsic evidence or substitute his
or her vision or expectations of the "truth" for that described by the
plaintiff.
It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees
only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particu-
lar case, of which he is not informed judicially; a private deed,
not communicated to him, whatever may be its character . . . is
totally unknown, and cannot be acted upon. The looseness
which would be introduced into judicial proceedings would
prove fatal to the great principles of justice, if the judge might
notice and act upon facts not brought regularly into the cause;
such a proceeding, in ordinary cases, would subvert the best es-
tablished principles, and overturn those rules which have been
settled by the wisdom of ages.4 1
III. TwoMBLY, IQBAL, AND THE "NEW" FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARD
Despite periodic calls for reform, 42 it was generally accepted by the
Supreme Court, lower courts, and practitioners that liberal notice plead-
ing was the law of the land43 unless and until Rule 8(a) was amended
through the rulemaking process. 44 Thus, Rule 8(a) did not permit a dis-
trict court to dismiss a complaint that gave the defendant notice of the
plaintiffs claim and the grounds upon which it rested "unless it ap-
40. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
41. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
42. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 445-46 (1986) (criticizing "lax" federal
pleading standards and pro-plaintiff bias in federal rules).
43. See, e.g., Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves
in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 851,
855 (2008) ("Whatever its consequences, the Conley standard was clear and well-
settled. There was certainly no groundswell to reexamine Conley, and no one
thought that it was in danger of being altered."). See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1215 (3d ed.
2004) (listing cases treating pleading standards).
44. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) ("A require-
ment of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by
the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.'"
(quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics & Intelligence Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993))); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ("[O]ur
cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary
judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemak-
ing process or the legislative process.").
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pear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."4 5
This settled meaning of Rule 8(a) was reiterated numerous times by
the Supreme Court despite efforts by various district courts to heighten
the pleading standard by requiring the plaintiff to allege more specific
facts in support of a claim. As recently as 2002, the Supreme Court stated
in a unanimous opinion that:
[Rule 8(a) (2)] provides that a complaint must include only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief." Such a statement must simply "give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of un-
meritorious claims.
... Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading,
"[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved con-
sistent with the allegations." . . . The liberal notice pleading of
Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,
which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.4 6
In 2007, however, the Supreme Court gave new meaning to Rule 8(a).
A. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the plaintiff-consumers filed a puta-
tive class action alleging that the defendant-telecommunications compa-
nies had illegally conspired to restrain trade.4 7 The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege facts showing that the defendants entered into an illegal
agreement, and had instead asked the court to infer the existence of such
an agreement based on parallel conduct. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss because an illegal agreement between the defendants
was not the only possible explanation for their parallel conduct.4 8 The
court held that the plaintiffs were required to allege at least one additional
fact (referred to as a "plus factor") "that tends to exclude independent
self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants' parallel behav-
45. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
46. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513-14 (citation omitted) (quoting Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
47. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
48. See id. at 552.
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ior."49 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to allege neces-
sary facts "suspicious enough to suggest that defendants [were] acting
pursuant to a mutual agreement rather than their own individual self-
interest."5 0
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.5 ' Following
existing precedent, the court held that the plaintiffs merely had to allege
facts that "include Ldj conspiracy among the realm of 'plausible' possibili-
ties in order to survive a motion to dismiss" and found that they had done
so. 5 2 The Second Circuit then noted that the district court had neglected
the Conley standard in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint. It concluded
that "to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail to sup-
port a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude that
there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than
coincidence."5 3
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit. In a 7-2 opinion
authored by Justice Souter, the Court stated that Conley's
"no set of facts" language can be read in isolation as saying that
any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the plead-
ings; and the Court of Appeals appears to have read Conley in
some such way when formulating its understanding of the proper
pleading standard.54
The Supreme Court interpreted the Conley standard as one of factual
sufficiency (arguably wrongly so),66 and explicitly rejected that standard.56
Instead, the Court stated that a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."5 7 The Court held that the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be granted
"[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible."58
49. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 544.
50. Id. at 182.
51. See Twombly, 425 F.3d at 102.
52. See id. at 114 (reversing district court decision).
53. Id.
54. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).
55. See Couture, supra note 12, at 24-29 (discussing factual sufficiency stan-
dard in Conley). See generally Shannon, supra note 12.
56. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63.
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id. Likewise, the Court stated that "[a]n allegation of parallel conduct ...
gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual en-
hancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'enti-
tle[ment] to relief.'" Id. at 557 (alteration in original).
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The Court expressly denied that it wanted district court judges to de-
termine the probability of success on a claim.5 9 Nevertheless, "[i]n so rul-
ing, the Court imposed an entirely new test on the pleading stage,
instituting a judicial inquiry into the pleading's convincingness."6 0
B. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
In 2009, the Court revisited its new pleading test and made clear that
this new test applied to all federal civil complaints, not just complaints
seeking to assert a claim for an antitrust violation.6 1 This opinion, how-
ever, garnered a bare 5-4 majority and Justice Souter, the author of the
Twombly opinion, dissented.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim who was arrested in the wake of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks sued, among others, former Attorney General
John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.6 2 Javaid Iqbal alleged
that the defendants violated the Constitution when they subjected him to
harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate peno-
logical interest."6 3 Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the claims
against them.64 The district court, relying on the Conley "no set of facts"
standard, denied the motion.65
While the defendants' appeal to the Second Circuit was pending, the
Supreme Court issued its Twombly opinion. The Second Circuit applied
the new "plausibility" standard to Iqbal's complaint and affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion focused on the defendants' status as high-ranking government
officials who could not be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of
their subordinates.6 6 Instead, the Court noted the following:
[T]o state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established
right, [the plaintiff] must plead sufficient factual matter to show
that [defendants Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and imple-
mented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investiga-
59. See id. at 545 ("Asking for plausible grounds does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasona-
ble expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.").
60. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Sys-
tems, 95 IOWA L. REv. 821, 827 (2010).
61. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) ("Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' and it applies to
antitrust and discrimination suits alike." (citation omitted)).
62. See id. at 1939.
63. Id. at 1944 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See id. The complaint alleged twenty-one causes of action against thirty-
four current and former federal officials and nineteen "John Doe" federal correc-
tions officers. See id. at 1943. But only the allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller
were relevant to the issues before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1943-44.
65. See id. at 1944-45.
66. See id. at 1948.
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tive reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of
race, religion, or national origin."6 7
In other words, the plaintiff had to allege specific facts establishing that
the defendants acted with a discriminatory state of mind.
The Supreme Court then applied its new pleading test to the com-
plaint in Iqbal The Court determined that the following allegations were
"conclusory" and therefore unworthy of an assumption of truth: (1) that
the defendants "'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed
to subject [Iqbal]' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of pol-
icy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and
for no legitimate penological interest'"; (2) "that Ashcroft was the 'princi-
pal architect' of this invidious policy"; and (3) "that Mueller was 'instru-
mental' in adopting and executing it."6 8 Not surprisingly, the Court's
conclusion that it was required to disregard these conclusory allegations
has come under significant criticism. Professors Kevin M. Clermont and
Stephen C. Yeazell have stated that the Court's new framework is illegiti-
mate because it contravenes the history and purpose of the Federal Rules:
"the system of civil litigation created by the Federal Rules had always
credited conclusory allegations."69 None other than Justice Souter, the
author of the Court's Twombly opinion, argued in dissent that, even ac-
cepting the premise that Rule 8 required the Court to disregard con-
clusory allegations, the Court had wrongly rejected a slew of factual
allegations as conclusory. Justice Souter's opinion is shared by a long list
of civil procedure scholars.7 0
The Supreme Court next considered the remaining factual allega-
tions "to determine if they plausibly suggest[ed] an entitlement to re-
lief."7 1 The Court identified two nonconclusory allegations: (1) that "the
[FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and de-
tained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11"; and (2) that "[t]he policy of holding post-Sep-
tember-1Ith detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement un-
til they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT
67. Id. at 1948-49.
68. See id. at 1951 (citations omitted).
69. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 60, at 836.
70. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Com-
ment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 859-60 (2010); Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 60, at 834-36; Sybil Dunlop & Elizabeth Cowan Wright, Plausible
Deniability: How the Supreme Court Created a Heightened Pleading Standard Without Ad-
mitting They Did So, 33 HAMLINE L. REv. 205, 221-22 (2010); Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 Am. U. L. REv.
553, 580-81 (2010); Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court's Disregard for Claims of Discrimination,
58 BUFF. L. REv. 419, 485 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward
Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & ClARK L. REv. 185, 194-95 (2010).
71. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
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and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001."72
The Court quickly concluded that such allegations were "consistent with
[the defendants'] purposefully designating detainees 'of high interest' be-
cause of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely ex-
planations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose."73
The Court adopted the Twombly plausibility standard in Iqbal, but it
provided little guidance on how to draw the line between plausible and
implausible claims.74 The Supreme Court again expressly denied that it
wanted district court judges to determine the probability of success on a
claim.75 But the Supreme Court clearly went further in that direction in
Iqbal than it did in Twombly. Numerous commentators quickly swung into
action to try to define and explain the meaning of plausibility.76 Although
these commentators define plausibility differently, they generally agree
that plausibility is a more rigorous standard and that the Supreme Court
expects district courts to grant more motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.7 7 As Professor Robert Bone stated, "Twombly uses plausibility to
screen only for truly meritless suits, but Iqbal uses it to screen for weak
lawsuits too."7 8
72. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73. Id.
74. See Dobyns v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 412, 423 (2010) ("'Iqbal and
Twombly contain few guidelines to help the lower courts discern the difference
between a "plausible" and an implausible claim and a "conclusion" from a "de-
tailed fact."'" (quoting Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002-03 (W.D. Wis.
2009)).
75. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defen-
dant has acted unlawfully." (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007))).
76. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 70, at 859-60; Scott Dodson, Comparative Conver-
gences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 441, 461-63 (2010) (remarking that
plausibility standard is "more restrictive" than past standards and represents "ma-
jor shift" from previous pleading requirements); McMahon, supra note 43, at 863-
64; David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy ofIqbal, 99 GEo. L.J. 117, 134-35 (2010) (exam-
ining threshold of plausibility, questions regarding plaintiffs lack of knowledge,
and issues surrounding affirmative defenses); Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and
Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1, 2; A. Benjamin Spencer, Under-
standing Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2009); Daniel W. Robertson, Note,
In Defense of Plausibility: Ashcroft v. Iqbal and What the Plausibility Standard Really
Means, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 111, 129 (2010) (calling plausibility standard "minimal
threshold" and "relatively low bar" for plaintiffs); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Be-
tween the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 530 (2009).
77. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 76, at 2 (suggesting that district court judges
are invited to dismiss claims based on their subjective notions); see also Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 60; Dunlop & Wright, supra note 70, at 221-22; Spencer, supra
note 70, at 194-95 (arguing that plausibility standard amounts to heightened evi-
dentiary requirement).
78. Bone, supra note 70, at 851. "By a 'truly meritless suit,' I mean a lawsuit in
which the defendant is clearly not liable as an objective matter." Id. at 870 (emphasis
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IV. TWOMBLY, IQBAL AND THE MEANING AND APPLICATION
OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
The Supreme Court's plausibility test includes the following new
principles:
- "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
cepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face."' 7
- "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to
relief.' "80
- In determining whether relief is plausible, the judge must ap-
ply judicial experience and common sense to the remaining
factual allegations in the light of the context of the particular
case.8 1
Although much has been written about the Supreme Court's new
plausibility standard, very little has been written about the Court's state-
ment that a district court must "draw on its judicial experience" to deter-
mine whether a claim is plausible. Some commentators have questioned
what the phrase 'judicial experience" means:
What exactly is judicial experience and common sense? Should a
judge rely on past cases involving similar factual situations? How
similar do these cases have to be? Would this small sample even
be a useful source of information from which to draw a conclu-
sion? What if a judge was new to the bench?82
This Article seeks to answer the question, "What is judicial experience and
how does a court apply it?" This Article does not focus on the meaning
and application of the well-defined term "common sense."8 3
added). A lawsuit that is not meritless, but is "weak," is one with "too low a
probability of trial success." Id.
79. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. See id. at 1950.
82. Stephen R. Brown, Correlation Plausibility: A Framework for Fairness and Pre-
dictability in Pleading Practice After Twombly and Iqbal, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 141,
144-45 (2010).
83. As set forth in BLACK's LAw DIciONARY:
871
15
Noyes: The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The federal courts generally have not discussed the meaning of judi-
cial experience or the proper method to apply it.8 4 Early commentary on
the Court's new pleading standard often mentions the application ofjudi-
cial experience, but simply asserts that the standard is self-defining or obvi-
ous.8 5 Most commentators assume, or conclude without stating the basis
for their conclusions, that the application ofjudicial experience requires a
district court to make subjective determinations about whether the plain-
tiff's vision of the world is credible and whether the claim is meritorious.8 6
Common Sense. Sound practical judgment; that degree of intelli-
gence and reason, as exercised upon the relations of persons and things
and the ordinary affairs of life, which is possessed by the generality of
mankind, and which would suffice to direct the conduct and actions of
the individual in a manner to agree with the behavior of ordinary
persons.
BLACK'S LAw DIcrlONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990). Because the Supreme Court used the
separate phrases of "judicial experience" and "common sense," it is likely that the
Court intended for them to have different meanings.
84. A February 27, 2011 Westlaw search of the "ALLFEDS" database for the
words "judicial /2 experience" and a date after 2008 returned nearly 3,500 docu-
ments. Clearly, many courts refer to the application of judicial experience. A re-
view of the decisions, however, gives no insight into what judicial experience
entails or how a district court is to apply it. For example, the search revealed forty
published opinions issued by one of the federal courts of appeal. None of these
forty published opinions discussed the meaning of "judicial experience."
85. Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2009, at A10, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9FO2E1DAl53AF932Al5754COA96F9C8B63&ref=adamliptak (quot-
ing Professor Stephen Burbank that new standard "'obviously licenses highly sub-
jective judgments"' and "'is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases they
disfavor'").
86. See Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More Subjectivity to Rulings on
Dismissal Motions, judge Says, 78 U.S.L.W. 2667, 2667 (2010) (quoting district court
Judge Sydney Stein that new standard will be "'more subjective, more flexible'");
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test
to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1, 39 n.322 (2010) ("Experience and common sense
inherently invite a subjective analysis."); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About
Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1337, 1355 (2010) (opining that plausibil-
ity test is "unclear and subjective"); Matthew Fischer, IP Litigation Strategies in the
Context of Current Trends, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASES 20 (Michaela Falls ed., 2010) ("What makes the application of the plausibil-
ity standard so unpredictable is that the Supreme Court left it to the subjectivity of
each district court . . . ."); Hatamyar, supra, note 70, at 624 ("Iqbal uncritically
embraced Twombly's 'plausibility' standard without providing much further gui-
dance except for the highly subjective directive to the lower courts to use 'judicial
experience and common sense.'"); Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exception-
alism, 2009 Sup. CT. REv. 225, 270-71 (" [T]he decision invites 680-plus district
judges to conjure rules on the fly by applying 680-plus distinct bodies of 'judicial
experience and common sense' to assess 'plausibility.'"); Ramzi Kassem, Implausi-
ble Realities: Iqbal's Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination
Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1443, 1447 (2010) (treating "Iqbal's Disquieting Em-
brace of Judicial Subjectivity"); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lift-
ing: How Pre-dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil
Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65, 93 (2010) (remarking that application of
"judicial experience and common sense" permits "subjectivity [that] can result in
multiple outcomes in cases in which there are comparable pleadings"); Arthur R.
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The few federal judges who have spoken on the issue also assume that the
application of judicial experience requires a subjective determination.8 7
This understanding of judicial experience is consistent with the Supreme
Court's statement that a district court must draw on itsjudicial experience,
rather than judicial experience in general.
Most commentators take the view that the addition of such subjectiv-
ity supports arguments against our current litigation system.88 District
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2010) (arguing that judicial experience and common
sense are "highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely devoid of accepted-
let alone universal-meaning"); Miller, supra, at 29 ("[T]he Court provided little
direction on how to measure the palpably subjective factors of 'judicial experi-
ence,' 'common sense,' and a 'more likely' alternative explanation it has inserted
into the Rule 12(b)(6) dynamic."); Rothman, supra note 76, at 2 ("[I]t appears to
be a standard that invites district court judges to dismiss cases based on their own
subjective notions of what is probably true-a determination that apparently can be
made based on events outside the four corners of the complaint."); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape ofFederal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 530 (2010)
(" [R]eliance on 'judicial experience' and 'common sense' necessarily adds a more
subjective element to a district court's assessment of whether a plaintiffs claim
should go forward."); Spencer, supra note 70, at 186 ("One thing that is remarka-
ble about [Iqbal] is the Court's decision to permit judges to disregard certain al-
leged facts and use their 'experience and common sense' to evaluate the
plausibility of a claim, rather than holding them to the traditional and more objec-
tive approach. . . ."); Rajiv Mohan, Recent Development, A Retreat from Decision by
Rule in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1191,
1197 (2010) ("This expression of the role of the judiciary suggests that plausibility
is not meant to be guided by clear principles, but instead by the wisdom of
judges.").
87. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1346 (11th Cir.
2010) (Ryskamp,J., dissenting) ("When plausibility is based on ajudge's common
sense and experience, different judges will have different opinions as to what is
plausible, resulting in a totally subjective standard for determining the sufficiency
of a complaint."); see also Shira A. Scheindlin, The Future of Litigation, in 27TH AN-
NUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTs LITIGATION, at 1371, 1374-75 (PLI Lit. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 836, 2010) ("Now [applying judicial experi-
ence and common sense] is and should be a frightening thought. When courts
are told to draw on experience and common sense that means that predictability
will vanish because every judge has had different experiences and has a different
definition of common sense."). But see Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 752 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that application of judicial experience
requires district court to apply "practical test of objective experience").
88. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) ("Judgments about the plausibility of a
complaint are necessarily comparative. They depend in that regard on a judge's
background knowledge and assumptions, which seem every bit as vulnerable to the
biasing effect of that individual's cultural predispositions as are judgments about
adjudicative facts."); Scheindlin, supra note 87, at 1374-75 (noting negative conse-
quences of new standard: decreased predictability of motions to dismiss, increased
outcome determination by judges instead of juries, and higher likelihood of dis-
missal in complex litigation); Allan R. Stein, Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REv. 277,
284 (2009) ("To allow a judge to make those determinations based on his own
sense of history and human behavior without the benefit of an adversarial presen-
tation of the facts is the precise definition of prejudice: he is pre-judging, without
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Judge Lee Rosenthal, who is also Chair of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, has stated:
Some of the reaction to Twombly, and particularly to Iqbal, is hard
for me to read as a judge because it reveals a somewhat cynical
view of what judges do and how they do it. That view is that
judges, either intent on advancing a personal ideological agenda
or helpless to prevent the influence of that agenda, will use the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions to dismiss "disfavored" cases.89
In order to assess the impact of this new plausibility standard on our
system of litigation, we need to determine what the Supreme Court means
when it commands a district court to draw on its judicial experience.9 0
A. Twombly, Iqbal, and Judicial Experience
What did the Supreme Court say in Twombly and Iqbal about the
meaning and application of judicial experience? Almost nothing.
The Supreme Court never used the phrase "judicial experience" in its
Twombly opinion.9 1 It used the word "experience" once in its Twombly
opinion. The Court stated:
The nub of the complaint, then, is the ILECs' parallel behavior,
consisting of steps to keep the CLECs out and manifest disinter-
est in becoming CLECs themselves, and its sufficiency turns on
the suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of
common economic experience.92
This understanding of experience does not require a subjective deter-
mination. Instead, it invites an objective determination, What is the most
reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts asserted in the instant
regard to the evidence."); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L.
REv. 1293, 1313 (2010) ("On its own terms, this inquiry places few constraints on
judges and embraces a dangerous amount of subjectivity."); Mohan, supra note 86,
at 1199 ("Furthermore, the arbitrariness inherent in Iqbal's new standard threatens
to increase partiality in judicial decision making."). But see Edward A. Hartnett,
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 498 (2010) ("The need
to rely on experience and common sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical-
it is a staple of inductive reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of
adjudication.").
89. Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversations After Iqbal, 114
PENN. ST. L. REv. 1537, 1547 (2010).
90. See Noll, supra note 76, at 138 ("If 'judicial experience and common sense'
constitutes a license to rely on broad new categories of extrinsic information at a
motion to dismiss, the critics' fears that motion to dismiss practice will be unduly
influenced by individual judges' differing views of life, the universe, and everything
may be warranted. If, on the other hand, 'judicial experience and common sense'
introduces only a few new premises into courts' analysis, the critics' fears may be
overstated." (footnote omitted)).
91. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
92. Id. at 565.
874 [Vol. 56: p. 857
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case by reference to a larger body of experience (beyond the experience
of this particular district court) with similar factual scenarios?
The Court used the phrase "judicial experience" once in its Iqbal
opinion:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for re-
lief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial expe-
rience and common sense.9 3
The Court did not elaborate on what constitutes judicial experience. 94
Nor did it indicate how a district court should apply judicial experience
when reviewing a complaint to determine whether the complaint stated a
"plausible" claim.
B. The Supreme Court's Reference to the Second Circuit's "Observation" That a
District Court Must Draw on Its Judicial Experience
In its Iqbal opinion, the Supreme Court made it appear as though the
application of judicial experience on a motion to dismiss was not a new
concept. The Supreme Court specifically stated that the Second Circuit
had "observed" at pages 157 and 158 of its Iqbal opinion that a district
court must "draw on its judicial experience and common sense" when as-
sessing the plausibility of a claim.9 5 In fact, the Second Circuit never used
the phrases, or discussed the concepts of, "judicial experience" or "com-
mon sense" anywhere in its Iqbal opinion. 96
The Second Circuit referred to the use of "experience" only once in
its opinion.97 This reference occurred in a context that is expressly unre-
lated to judicial experience and unrelated to the determination whether a
complaint withstands a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.98 The Second
Circuit quoted from the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin,9 9
which discussed "the experience of prison administrators" to determine
whether a prison inmate received adequate procedural protections under
Mathews v. Eldridge.10 0 The Second Circuit never referred to "experience"
93. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
94. See Noll, supra note 76, at 137 ("[The Court] did not address the kind (or
sources) of information that inform a court's judicial experience and common
sense.").
95. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
96. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 143.
97. Id. at 163. The Second Circuit never used the words "common" or
"sense."
98. See id.
99. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
100. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 163 ("After weighing all the relevant factors, the Court
found that '[w]here the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison adminis-
trators, and where the State's interest implicates the safety of other inmates and
875
19
Noyes: The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
VILLANOVA 1LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: p. 857
of any kind at pages 157 and 158 of its opinion. Nor did it ever refer to
"common sense."
Beginning at page 157 and continuing to page 158 (the specific pages
of the Second Circuit's opinion that the Supreme Court cited), the Sec-
ond Circuit wrote:
After careful consideration of the Court's [ Twombly] opinion and
the conflicting signals from it that we have identified, we believe
the Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact
pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible "plausibility stan-
dard," which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some fac-
tual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is
needed to render the claim plausible.10 1
This might be an observation that more is needed when the court thinks more is
needed. If so, then the application ofjudicial experience could be subjec-
tive-untethered to any legal standard or principle.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court might understand the appli-
cation of judicial experience to constitute a new (or at least previously
unidentified) part of the federal pleading regime. 102 I take the Supreme
Court seriously when it says "[t]wo working principles underlie [its] deci-
sion in Twombly" and application of one such principle-the determina-
tion of plausibility-"requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." 0 3
The plausibility standard is flexible. Judicial experience must inform
the district court about what is plausible in the context of each case. For
example, the Supreme Court might understand the application ofjudicial
experience to require a district court (1) to consider the type of claim
alleged, the type of plaintiff alleging the claim, the type of defendant be-
ing sued, and the vision of reality alleged by the plaintiff, and then (2) to
consider a larger, objective body of experience-beyond the subjective ex-
perience of any particular district court-with similar factual scenarios. If
prior cases and the views of commentators conclude that this type of plain-
tiff usually lost on this type of claim against this type of defendant or that
prison personnel,... informal, nonadversary procedures' were sufficient." (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228-29)).
101. Id. at 157-58.
102. When reflecting on his Second Circuit opinion in the Iqbal case and the
Supreme Court's comment on that opinion, Judge Jon 0. Newman remarked that
is not clear whether the Supreme Court intended the phrase "drawing on judicial
experience and common sense" to be descriptive or definitive. See E-mail fromJon
Newman, Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to
Henry Noyes, Professor of Law (Mar. 14, 2011) (on file with author). If the phrase
is merely descriptive of what judges have always done, then the language does not
add anything new to the standards that a court must apply and the sources that
they may reference when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See infra notes 124-29 and
accompanying text. If the phrase is definitive, however, then district courts must
determine the proper meaning of judicial experience and then apply it.
103. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
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discovery is particularly costly or that this type of claim is flooding the
courts, then the court should dismiss the claim because the complaint
"failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible." 0 4
The latter understanding indicates some semantic gymnastics by the
Supreme Court. The Court "doth protest too much"10 5 that it does "not
require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."1 0 6 The Court proclaims
that plausibility is always the standard. But what plausibility means is in-
formed by judicial experience. In the words of the Second Circuit (the
Supreme Court cites approvingly), the standard is always plausibility, but
plausibility is itself a "flexible" standard. Although the standard is always
the same, because plausibility is a flexible standard, certain plaintiffs and
certain types of claims require more convincing facts (not more specific
facts). 107 I agree with the Court that this is not "heightened fact pleading
of specifics," but it is nevertheless a hierarchy of pleading requirements
that results in heightened pleading standards for certain claims and
claimants. 10
C. The Syllabus of the Supreme Court's Iqbal Opinion Cites to the Supreme
Court's Twombly Opinion on "Experience and Common Sense"
The syllabus of the Supreme Court's Iqbal opinion cites to Twombly for
the proposition that "determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its expe-
rience and common sense."10 9 The syllabus is, of course, not a part of the
Supreme Court's opinion.110 Nevertheless, in support of the proposition
that a court should draw on its experience, the syllabus cites to the Court's
Twombly decision at page 556 of the relevant volume of the U.S. Reports."
104. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
105. WiuAMvi SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
106. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Clermont, supra note 86, at 1340-50
(noting that it is myth that Supreme Court has "readopted fact pleading for the
federal courts").
107. See Clermont, supra note 86, at 1345 (discussing plausibility tests for "fac-
tual convincingness").
108. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. For further discussion of the resulting hierar-
chy of pleading requirements, see infra notes 116-21, 137-69, and accompanying
text.
109. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
110. When the decisions of the Supreme Court are released, they are accom-
panied by the now-familiar refrain that "[t]he syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader." See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1939 n.*. The syllabus is a
summary of the case prepared by the "Reporter of Decisions," a non-judicial court
official who is appointed by the Supreme Court and is responsible for editing and
publishing the Court's decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 673(c) (2006) ("The reporter
shall, under the direction of the Court or the ChiefJustice, prepare the decisions
of the Court for publication in bound volumes and advance copies in pamphlet
installments.").
111. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.
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At page 556 of its Twombly decision, the Supreme Court stated the follow-
ing well-settled principle: "And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." 11 2
This quote supports the idea that a complaint will survive despite the
fact that ajudge, employing judicial experience, makes a subjective determi-
nation that the claim is likely to fail. It is an argument against the consider-
ation of subjective judicial experience in reviewing a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
The Supreme Court then went on to state the following (also at page
556 of its opinion):
In identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render a § 1
conspiracy plausible, we have the benefit of the prior rulings and
considered views of leading commentators, already quoted, that
lawful parallel conduct fails to bespeak unlawful agreement. It
makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel con-
duct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.'1
A district court drawing on judicial experience in deciding a motion
to dismiss must consider information and evidence beyond that alleged in
the complaint, including "the benefit of the prior rulings and considered
views of leading commentators," when deciding whether a claim is plausi-
ble.114 Consistent with this understanding of judicial experience, the dis-
trict court will look to outside sources to decide whether it should accept
or reject this particular plaintiffs world view.1 15 If prior cases and the
views of commentators conclude that this type of plaintiff usually lost on
this type of claim against this type of defendant, then the court should dis-
miss the claim as implausible, absent a more convincing showing by the
plaintiff. Again, this understanding of judicial experience invites an objec-
tive determination, What is the most reasonable inference to be drawn
from the facts asserted in the instant case by reference to a larger body of
experience (beyond the experience of this particular district court) with
similar factual scenarios?
112. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Cf Noll, supra note 76, at 139 ("In view of the Court's reliance on these
essentially legal sources, it seems that Iqba4 at most, should be read to authorize
courts to rely on what scholars of administrative law have referred to as 'judgmen-
tal facts' in adjudicating a motion to dismiss. Such 'facts'-in reality, value-loaded
judgments about how the world operates-inhabit a grey area between the sub-
stantive law and propositions so obvious or widely accepted they may be judicially
noticed." (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 56: p. 857878
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss5/4
2012] RISE OF THE COMMON LAW OF FEDERAL PLEADING
V. THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF "EXPERIENCE AND COMMON
SENSE" IN CAPERTON V. A. T. MASsEY COAL Co.
Shortly after it issued its Iqbal opinion, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co." 6 In that opinion the Court
specified that the application of "experience and common sense" by a dis-
trict court was a process that involved an objective determination.
Caperton involved a claim that a West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals justice's failure to recuse himself from hearing the appeal of a corpo-
ration who had lost at trial to the tune of a $50 million judgment and
whose chief executive officer had contributed $3 million to the justice's
election campaign.1 17 The Court held that the West Virginia justice's re-
fusal to recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.""
In reaching its decision, the majority determined that a due process
challenge of this type required the court to undertake an objective evalua-
tion of the circumstances and the risk of bias on the part of the judge
whose recusal is requested. The Court stated:
As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at com-
mon law, however, the Court has identified additional instances
which, as an objective matter, require recusal. These are circum-
stances "in which experience teaches that the probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable."1 19
The Court was quite clearly referring to a collective judicial experi-
ence which, when applied objectively, dictates the result even though the
judge subjectively reaches a different conclusion.
Later in that same opinion, the Supreme Court described what it is
that judges do when they perform their judicial function: "The judge in-
quires into reasons that seem to be leading to a particular result. Prece-
dent and stare decisis and the text and purpose of the law and the
Constitution; logic and scholarship and experience and common sense. ... "120
For practical purposes, this is the same phrase used in the Supreme
Court's Iqbal opinion. The Court places scholarship in the same judicial
toolbox as experience and common sense. Reliance on judicial experi-
ence to resolve a motion to dismiss, like a request for recusal, requires the
court to refer to extrinsic evidence. 12 1
116. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
117. See id. at 2256-59.
118. See id. at 2264-65.
119. Id. at 2259 (emphasis added) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47 (1975)).
120. Id. at 2252 (emphasis added).
121. Judicial reference to extrinsic evidence when considering a request for
recusal would be appropriate and consistent with the adversarial process, however,
because the larger judicial body is determining whether the particular judge on
879
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VI. THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
IN PRE-1QBAL DECISIONS
Prior to issuance of its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Justices of
the Supreme Court had used the phrase 'judicial experience" in their
opinions in thirty-five different cases. 122 Only three of these cases in-
volved resolution of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer or something akin
to a motion to dismiss.' 2 3 None of those three decisions involved the ap-
plication of judicial experience to a set of alleged or litigated facts.
In those thirty-five opinions, the Supreme Court has used the phrase
'judicial experience" with three different meanings. Under any of these
three definitions, the application ofjudicial experience does not require a
district court to make a subjective judgment about whether the plaintiffs
vision of the world is true. Nor does it require a district court to make a
subjective judgment about the merits of a claim.
A. Some judges Have Done What Judges Do More Than Other judges
In the course of its opinions, the Supreme Court has referred to judi-
cial experience to indicate that a particular judge or group ofjudges have
served on the bench for a number of years and have been exposed to a
the case is no longer impartial. By contrast, judicial reference to extrinsic evidence
when considering a motion to dismiss is inappropriate and inconsistent with the
adversarial process. For a further discussion of the application of judicial experi-
ence and the adversarial nature of litigation, see infta notes 181-99 and accompa-
nying text.
122. On March 10, 2011, a search of "judicial /1 experience" in the "SCT"
database on Westlaw retrieved thirty-seven Supreme Court cases. One of these
thirty-seven decisions was the Court's opinion in Iqbal. One other decision in-
cluded the phrase "judicial experience" in the prefatory statement of the appel-
lants but did not include the phrase anywhere in the Court's opinion. See Lorings
v. Marsh, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 337, 342 (1867).
123. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 282 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating, in appeal of action dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state claim, that "controlling factor in such [nonjusticiable political
question] cases is that, decision respecting these kinds of complex matters of pol-
icy being traditionally committed not to courts but to the political agencies of gov-
ernment for determination by criteria of political expediency, there exists no
standard ascertainable by judicial experience or process by reference to which a
political decision affecting the question at issue between the parties can be
judged"); Watson v. Emp'rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 79 (1954) (Frank-
furter,J., concurring) (reversing district court's decision granting defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss claims as unconstitutional and noting that earlier opinion
recognizing states' "absolute" and unconditional right to exclude foreign corpora-
tions or condition their entry as matter entirely within their discretion had been
tempered and qualified by "considerable further judicial experience"); Magniac v.
Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281, 299 (1853) (affirming lower court decision sus-
taining demurrer and stating that "[t]o the test of these rules the case before us, in
common with every appeal to equity, should be brought, and if the effect of such
test should prove to be adverse, that effect should be sought in the character of the
appeal itself, and not in objections to maxims which judicial experience and wis-
dom have long established").
[Vol. 56: p. 857880
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significant number of cases, parties, and legal issues during that time.' 2 4
For example, in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co.,12 5 Justice Frankfurter
wrote in his dissent:
Such disregard of sound judicial administration is emphasized by
the fact that the judges of the Court of Appeals are, by the very
nature of the business with which they deal, far more exper-
ienced than we in dealing with evidence, ascertaining the facts,
and determining the sufficiency of evidence to go to a jury.126
As proof of the greater experience of the judges of the Court of Appeals,
Justice Frankfurter stated the following in a footnote:
The CircuitJudges who decided this case have had the following
judicial experience Judge Sanborn: District Court of Minnesota,
1922-1925; United States District Court for the District of Minne-
sota, 1925-1932; United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, since 1932. Judge Woodrough: County Court, Ward
County, Texas, 1894-1896; United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska, 1916-1933; United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, since 1933. Judge Johnsen: Supreme
Court of Nebraska, 1939-1940; United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, since 1940.127
124. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 562 (1994) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) ("Out of this reconciliation of principle and practice comes the recogni-
tion that ajudge's prior judicial experience and contacts need not, and often do
not, give rise to reasonable questions concerning impartiality."); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989) (rejecting prisoner's challenge to constitu-
tionality of U.S. Sentencing Commission and stating that "judicial participation on
the Commission ensures that judicial experience and expertise will inform the pro-
mulgation of rules for the exercise of the Judicial Branch's own business-that of
passing sentence on every criminal defendant"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
677 n.13 (1988) (rejecting challenge to Ethics and Government Act which author-
ized appointment of independent counsel by court and stating that "in light of
judicial experience with prosecutors in criminal cases, it could be said that courts
are especially well qualified to appoint prosecutors"); Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co, 359
U.S. 437, 463 n.34 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (reviewing jury verdict for
plaintiff for sufficiency of evidence and listing judicial biographies of three Eighth
Circuit judges to demonstrate their "judicial experience"); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (White,J., dissenting) (stating that "[m]y brief
judicial experience has convinced me that the custom of filing long dissenting
opinions is one 'more honored in the breach than in the observance'"), vacated,
158 U.S. 601 (1895); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 405 (1891) (Brewer, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "long judicial experience of those [Illinois district and circuit
court] judges, and their familiarity with the laws of Illinois, give to th[o]se opin-
ions great weight").
125. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
126. Id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 462 n.34 (emphasis added).
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This understanding of judicial experience employs the reasoning that
judges who have seen more cases develop proficiency and expertise in do-
ing what it is that judges do.128
If the Supreme Court meant with its Iqbal statement that a district
court should draw on its years of experience when deciding whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief, then the application of judi-
cial experience might not add anything new to our understanding of the
federal pleading standards. District court judges should apply their years
of experience in reviewing a complaint. Judges should "do what they do";
some judges will have "done what they do" more than others. As demon-
strated throughout this Article, I believe that the Supreme Court did not
intend this meaning when it referenced judicial experience in its Iqbal
opinion.
Even accepting this understanding of its meaning, however, judicial
experience does not require a district court to make a subjective determina-
tion of the plausibility of a claim. It simply stands for the principle that
judges who have had more judicial experience will be more familiar
with-and, therefore, generally better equipped to handle-the process of
making decisions that judges are required to undertake.'2 9
District Judge Sidney H. Stein considered the new Iqbal standard and
the use ofjudicial experience in his remarks to the American Bar Associa-
tion's Litigation Section.130 Judge Stein "questioned what the scope of
review on appeal of rulings on such motions will be, observing that he
does not know how closely appeals courts will be regulating the applica-
tion of judicial experience and common sense in reviewing motions to
dismiss."13 ' If the application of judicial experience requires a district
court to make a subjective determination whether the plaintiffs vision of
the world is credible and whether the claim is meritorious, then the appel-
late courts should give some deference to judges who have more judicial
experience. But appellate review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is de novo, not for abuse of discretion.' 3 2
A quick review of the judicial experience of the district court judge
who decided the motion to dismiss in the Iqbal case and the various judges
and Justices who reviewed that decision on appeal confirms that the Su-
preme Court does not expect appellate courts to give deference to judges
128. See United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 693 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Af-
ter sixty years of judicial experience with that [clear error] standard, it needs no
further explication. We jurists know what it means.").
129. See Hartnett, supra note 88, at 498 ("The need to rely on experience and
common sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical-it is a staple of inductive
reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudication.").
130. See generally Atkins, supra note 86 (providing statements of Judge Sidney
H. Stein, Southern District of New York).
131. Id. at 2667.
132. See Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th
Cir. 2011) ("The court reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim . . .).
[Vol. 56: p. 857882
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with more judicial experience. At the time he denied the motion to dis-
miss in the Iqbal case, DistrictJudgeJohn Gleeson had been a district court
judge for nearly eleven years.' 3 3 The three judges on the Second Circuit
panel that decided the Iqbal appeal and affirmed Judge Gleeson's order
denying the motion to dismiss had a collective twenty-three years of judi-
cial experience as district court judges.134 The nine Supreme Court Jus-
tices who decided the Iqbal case had a collective five years of experience as
trial court judges of any ilk. Eight of the Justices-Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito-never served as a trial judge.1 35
Justice Souter served as a trial judge on the Superior Court of New Hamp-
shire for five years.' 3 6 Thus, the five-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court who decided that Iqbal had failed to plead a plausible claim had
zero district court judicial experience. The district court judge and the
Second Circuit judges who determined that the plaintiff had stated a plau-
sible claim in Iqbal had a collective thirty-four years of district court judicial
experience. The Supreme Court did not give deference to the greater
trial court experience ofJudge Gleeson or the three Second Circuitjudges
because the application of judicial experience requires an objective deter-
mination regarding the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the
facts asserted in the instant case by reference to a larger body of experi-
ence-beyond the experience of this particular district court-with simi-
lar factual scenarios.
B. judicial Experience Leads to a Better Understanding of the "Real World"
Than That Proffered by a Party
The Supreme Court also has referred to judicial experience to ex-
plain why the Court sometimes rejects a proffered set of facts or infer-
ences-the judiciary knows better the way things happen in the real world
than the version that has been offered by one of the parties.' 3 7 For exam-
133. See judge Gleeson, NYED.USCOURTS.GOv, http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/
GeneralInformation/Court PhoneBook/JG/jg.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011)
(reporting biographical and professional information on Judge Gleeson). District
Judge John Gleeson entered on duty on October 24, 1994, and denied the motion
to dismiss on September 27, 2005.
134. See Circuit judges' Biographical Information, cA2.USCOURTS.GOv, http://
www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Judgesbio.htm#DJ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (reporting bi-
ographical and professional information on Second Circuit Court of Appeals
judges). Judge Jon 0. Newman served on the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut from 1971 to 1979. JudgeJose A. Cabranes served on the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut from 1979 to 1994. Judge Robert D. Sack had
no prior judicial experience as a trial court judge.
135. See Biographies of CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court, SuP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
136. Id.
137. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (reversing district court's
determination that redistricting plan adopted by state court violated Voting Rights
883
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Act and stating that "[i]n the District Court's view, based on '[j]udicial experience,
as well as the results of past elections,' a super-majority minority Senate district in
Minneapolis was required in order for a districting scheme to comply with the
Voting Rights Act" (quoting Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427, 440 (1992), rev'd,
507 U.S. 25)); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 382 n.17 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting 3 J. WIcmoRE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1970), for proposition that
"judicial experience" is basis for distrust of confessions made in certain factual
scenarios); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 119-20 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "the unusual threat to the truth-seeking process posed by the
frequent untrustworthiness of eyewitness identification testimony . . . combined
with the fact that juries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to such evidence,
is the fundamental fact ofjudicial experience ignored by the Court" in its opinion
(footnote omitted)); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 778 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating, in response to appeal raising questions concerning permissi-
ble scope under Fourth Amendment of search incident to lawful arrest, that it is
"the judgment of Congress [in enacting a statute that provides] that federal law
enforcement officers may reasonably make warrantless arrests upon probable
cause, and no judicial experience suggests that this judgment is infirm"), abrogated
by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44 (1967)
(quoting WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE for proposition that "ground of distru [s] t of con-
fessions made in certain situations is, in a rough and indefinite way,judicial experi-
ence" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Steelworkers v. United States,
361 U.S. 39, 57 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating, in action by United
States for injunction against labor strike commenced by Attorney General at direc-
tion of President of the United States pursuant to statute that permits President to
act when he is of opinion that strike will create national emergency, that "[sluch a
decision by the President to invoke the Courts' jurisdiction to enjoin, involving, as
it does, elements not susceptible of ordinary judicial proof nor within the general
range of judicial experience, is not within the competent scope of the exercise of
equitable 'discretion"'); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (af-
firming conviction for income tax evasion based on confession and corroborating
evidence and stating that foundation of rule that accused may not be convicted on
his own uncorroborated confession "lies in a long history of judicial experience
with confessions and in the realization that sound law enforcement requires police
investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused"); Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953) (affirming felony murder conviction and stating that "re-
liance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession com-
bines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience
shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence"), overruled in part bqyJackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951)
(holding that, although NLRB's findings are entitled to respect, reviewing court
must consider both evidence that supports NLRB's findings and evidence opposed
to NLRB's view and stating that "[w]e do not require that the examiner's findings
be given more weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experience they
deserve"); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(reversing murder conviction based on confession by fifteen-year-old defendant
and stating that "[a]gainst [the Ohio court's finding that the confession was volun-
tary despite the factual circumstances indicating otherwise] we have the judgment
that comes from judicial experience with the conduct of criminal trials as they pass
in review before this Court" and therefore reached a different conclusion); see also
Del Vecchio v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 883, 887 (1985) (quoting Stein, 346 U.S. at 192);
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 925 n.7 (1983) (same), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000);
Jackson, 378 U.S. at 384 n.11 (same); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489
(1963) (quoting Smith, 348 U.S. at 157); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 n.15
(1958) (quoting Stein, 346 U.S. at 192).
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ple, in its opinion in Stein v. New York, 1 3 the Supreme Court noted that
judicial experience led the courts to a better understanding of the reality
of coerced confessions than the view proffered by the Government.
Coerced confessions are not more stained with illegality than
other evidence obtained in violation of law. But reliance on a
coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a confes-
sion combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness
with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive
evidence. A beaten confession is a false foundation for any con-
viction, while evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure,
wire-tapping, or larceny may be and often is of the utmost verity.
Such police lawlessness therefore may not void state convictions
while forced confessions will do so.13 9
Given this understanding of judicial experience, district courts will
have leeway to reject the state of the world alleged by plaintiffs who are
thought to have a distorted view of the "real world."1 40 Likewise, district
courts will have leeway to accept the worldview of certain favored parties
whose views of the world are known to be trustworthy.
At oral argument in Iqbal, Solicitor General Garre urged the Supreme
Court to take such a position. He asked the Court to consider "common
government experience" in deciding whether the allegations against the
Attorney General and the Director of the FBI were too far-fetched to be
"plausible."
Well, we certainly think-I mean, in Bell Atlantic, the Court said
common economic experience would support its determination
in that case. We think here, and I think the brief filed by former
attorney generals from several different administrations makes
this point as well, that common government experience would
suggest that the Attorney General of the United States is not in-
volved in the sort of microscopic decisions .... 141
138. 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled in part byJackson, 378 U.S. 368.
139. Id. at 192.
140. See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1062-65 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming denial of motion to remand and stating that "when a district court can
determine, relying on its judicial experience and common sense, that a claim satis-
fies the amount-in-controversy requirements, it need not give credence to a plain-
tiff's representation that the value of the claim is indeterminate"); Black v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 10-80996-CIV, 2010 WL 4340281, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
22, 2010) ("[A] district court may employ its own judicial experience or common
sense to discern . . . whether a complaint establishes the jurisdictional amount in
controversy required for removal."). But see Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading
Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REv. 873, 888-89 (2009) ("What
Twombly requires is a set of allegations describing a state of affairs that differs from
a baseline of normality, and in a way that supports a stronger correlation to wrong-
doing than for baseline conduct.").
141. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 5168391 (italics added).
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This understanding of experience requires the court to reject the
plaintiffs proffered reality in favor of an objectively more likely reality. It is
not that the plaintiffs version of reality is impossible. Nevertheless, the
district court may close its eyes to the reality alleged by the plaintiff and
substitute a different version of events that hews more closely to the
court's objective expectation of reality based on experience.
C. judicial Experience Leads to the Development of Common Law Rules
The Supreme Court also has referred to judicial experience
as a proxy for the development, improvement, and refinement of
rules of law through the process of reviewing cases, considering com-
mentary of experts, and making decisions over time.142  For exam-
142. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 850 (1999) (reversing lower
court decision granting class certification and stating that "[a]lthough we might
assume, arguendo, that prior judicial experience with asbestos claims would allow a
court to make a sufficiently reliable determination of the probable total [number
of claims], the District Court here apparently thought otherwise"); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (affirming finding following
full trial that NCAA's television plan violated antitrust laws and stating that portion
of its decision "is not based on a lack ofjudicial experience" with particular market
context at issue); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 216 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (considering entry
of preliminary injunction prohibiting union from picketing on employer's prop-
erty and stating that test was "fashioned after some 15 years of judicial experience
with jurisdictional conflicts that threatened national labor policy"); Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296 (1977) (holding that Na-
tional Labor Relations Act did not preempt state law tort claim and stating that
"U]udicial experience with numerous approaches to the pre-emption problem in
the labor law area eventually led to the general rule set forth" and reaffirmed in
recent Supreme Court decisions); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
74-77 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reviewing judgment for plaintiff in defama-
tion action against radio station defendant followingjury trial and stating that it is
"impossible to say, at least without further judicial experience in this area, that the
First Amendment interest in avoiding self-censorship will always outweigh the state
interest in vindicating these policies" and that "where the jury authority has been
exercised within such constraints, and the plaintiff has proved that the speaker
acted out of express malice, given the present state ofjudicial experience, I think it
would be an unwarranted intrusion into the legitimate legislative processes of the
States and an impermissibly broad construction of the First Amendment to nullify
that state action"), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1953) (upholding assertion of privilege
and noting limited "judicial experience" of U.S. courts with application of military
and state secrets privilege, but greater "judicial experience in dealing with an anal-
ogous privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination"); Johnson v. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951) (holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause barred defen-
dant from collaterally attacking divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in sister
state court where defendant participated in original action and contested jurisdic-
tion in that original action and stating that "[f] rom judicial experience with and
interpretation of the [Full Faith and Credit Clause], there has emerged the suc-
cinct conclusion that the Framers intended it to help weld the independent states
into a nation by giving judgments within the jurisdiction of the rendering state the
same faith and credit in sister states as they have in the state of the original fo-
rum"); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1948) (affirming convic-
886 [Vol. 56: p. 857
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ple, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpen-
ters,'43 the Court stated:
The Garmon test, itself fashioned after some 15 years of judicial
experience with jurisdictional conflicts that threatened national
labor policy, has provided stability and predictability to a particu-
larly complex area of the law for nearly 20 years. Thus, the most
elementary notions of stare decisis dictate that the test be reconsid-
ered only upon a compelling showing, based on actual experi-
ence, that the test disserves important interests. 144
The Court's opinion in Amalgamated Ass'n of State, Electric Railway and Motor
Coach Employees of America v. Lockridgel45 noted that development of the
Garmon test-a general rule capable of easy application-was necessary "so
that lower courts may largely police themselves" and avoid the need for
the Supreme Court to determine "on a case-by-case basis ... whether each
particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be
thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal labor policy."1 4 6
The Court had tried a number of different approaches to this problem,
but none proved satisfactory.
It was, in short, experience-not pure logic-which initially
taught that each of these methods sacrificed important federal
interests in a uniform law of labor relations centrally adminis-
tion for bribing federal agent and stating that "[tuhe confusion and error [that]
would engender [from adopting a new rule allowing cross-examination about a
defendant's prior arrests] would seem too heavy a price to pay for an almost im-
perceptible logical improvement, if any, in a system which is justified, if at all, by
accumulated judicial experience rather than abstract logic"); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941) (holding that employer may not refuse to hire
employees solely because of their affiliation with labor union and stating that pol-
icy which Congress "expressed in defining the term 'employee' both affirmatively
and negatively . . . had behind it important practical and judicial experience");
The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 312 (1876) (stating that "U]udicial experience has given no
better guide than that furnished by Lord Stowell" in published judicial opinion in
appeal of action for damages resulting from steamboat collision with tugboat and
canal boat); Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281, 299 (1853) (affirming
lower court decision sustaining demurrer and stating that "[t]o the test of these
rules the case before us, in common with every appeal to equity, should be
brought, and if the effect of such test should prove to be adverse, that effect should
be sought in the character of the appeal itself, and not in objections to maxims
which judicial experience and wisdom have long established"); see also Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (quoting Michelson, 335 U.S. at 487).
143. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
144. Id. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Amalgamated Ass'n of St.,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1971)).
145. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
146. Id. at 289-90.
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tered by an expert agency without yielding anything in return by
way of predictability of ease of judicial application. 147
Thus, the Court refers to judicial experience to describe a process by
which the federal courts accumulate familiarity by trial and error and,
based on that familiarity, develop a general rule (or set of rules) capable
of easy application by the lower courts.
This meaning of judicial experience is akin to the development of
common law rules. As district courts review complaints applying this new
plausibility standard, they will be able to put different types of claims into
various categories and will establish presumptive rules as to the plausibility
of such claims. Courts will learn to be skeptical of certain types of claims.
They will learn to be predisposed to accept the plausibility of certain other
types of claims. Federal courts will accumulate judicial experience and
develop a new common law of pleading.
There is support for this understanding in the Twombly opinion. The
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n identifying facts that are suggestive
enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible, we have the benefit of the
prior rulings and considered views of leading commentators, already
quoted, that lawful parallel conduct fails to bespeak unlawful agree-
ment."148 Judicial experience will lead to a new, heightened pleading
standard for cases involving certain types of claims. 149
Chief Justice Roberts expressed a variation on this understanding at
oral argument in Iqbak
Well I thought, and others may know better in connection to Bell
Atlantic, but I thought in Bell Atlantic what we said is that there's a
standard but it's an affected [sic] by the context in which the
allegations are made. That was a context of a particular type of
antitrust violation and that affected how we would look at the
complaint. And here,... because we're looking at litigation in-
volving the Attorney General and the Director of FBI in connec-
tion with their national security responsibilities, that there ought
to be greater rigor applied to our examination of the
complaint.15 0
Judicial experience will lead to a common law of federal pleading.
The district courts will develop a hierarchy of pleading requirements that
will require a review of the complaint with greater or lesser rigor because
of the type of claim-for example, antitrust-or because of the context of
147. Id. at 291; see also Farmer, 430 U.S. at 296 (stating that "U]udicial experi-
ence with numerous approaches to the pre-emption problem in the labor law area
eventually led to the general rule set forth" in Garmon and Lockridge decisions).
148. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
149. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 32, at 27-29 (discussing application
of high plausibility standard "where the expected cost of false positive error is
great").
150. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 36-37 (italics added).
[Vol. 56: p. 857888
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the claim-for example, a claim against high-ranking government
officials.15 1
VII. THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE REQUIRES Disnucr
COURTS TO CREATE A COMMON LAw OF PLEADING STANDARDS
The Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal opinions herald the rise of a
common law of federal pleading standards in which district courts are ex-
pected to discern and develop a hierarchy of pleading requirements. As
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner recently stated, when resolving a
motion to dismiss, the court has "a question of the meaning of a common
law doctrine-namely the federal common law doctrine of pleading in
complex cases, announced in Twombly."1 52
This understanding of judicial experience and its application is con-
sistent with the Court's Twombly and Iqbal opinions, 153 the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Iqbal v. Hasty,154 the Supreme Court's Caperton
opinion,15 5 and the historic meaning and application of judicial experi-
ence in the Supreme Court's pre-Iqbal opinions.1 56
Judge Rosenthal notes that this understanding of judicial experience
and its application is not new to the federal rules or the federal courts:
Some of the discussion of Iqbal has focused on the use of the
words "judicial experience and common sense" in describing
how judges rule on motions to dismiss as reinforcing this cynical
view of judging. These are not new words: Rule 501 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, to use just one example, states that privi-
lege determinations "shall be governed by the principle of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience."15 7
What do courts do in such circumstances? The Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure tell us:
This rule contemplates the development of a uniform body of
rules of evidence to be applicable in trials of criminal cases in the
Federal courts. It is based on [two Supreme Court cases], which
151. See Scheindlin, supra note 87, at 1375 ("Because the Supreme Court per-
ceived the extraordinary burden of expensive discovery as a reason for raising the
pleading bar, the suggestion has been made that fact pleading is particularly ap-
propriate in complex cases but unnecessary in simple or average cases, where the
cost of discovery will not be so burdensome and the same vigilance in gatekeeping
by judges is not required.").
152. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2165 (2011).
153. See supra notes 79-115 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
157. Rosenthal, supra note 89, at 1547.
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indicated that in the absence of statute the Federal courts in
criminal cases are not bound by the State law of evidence, but are
guided by common law principles as interpreted by the Federal
courts "in the light of reason and experience." The rule does not
fetter the applicable law of evidence to that originally existing at
common law. It is contemplated that the law may be modified
and adjusted from time to time by judicial decisions.1 5 8
Again, this understanding ofjudicial experience invites an objective de-
termination, What is the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the
facts asserted in the instant case by reference to a larger body of experi-
ence (beyond the experience of this particular district court) with similar
factual scenarios? In other words, the application ofjudicial experience in
the context of federal pleadings requires the district courts to develop and
refine a hierarchy of pleading requirements.1 5 9
The application of judicial experience to develop a common law of
pleading standards also is similar to, and consistent with, the application
158. FED. R. Cium. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (1944) (citations omit-
ted). Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was itself derived from then-extant
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7-9
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058-59; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082-83. At the time the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1944, the Federal Rules of Evidence had
not yet been enacted.
159. See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) ("In other
words, the height of the pleading requirement is relative to circumstances.");
Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of for-
mer employee's suit against employer for fraud whether or not Twombly or Iqbal
apply); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Fair no-
tice under Rule 8(a) (2) depends on the type of case---some complaints will require at
least some factual allegations to make out a 'showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)); Barkes v. First Corr. Med., No. 06-104-JJF-MPT, 2010 WL 1418347, at *3
(D. Del. Apr. 7, 2010); Brace v. Massachusetts, 673 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D. Mass.
2009) ("Properly read, however, the holding of Twombly seems limited to highly
complex cases-like the antitrust matter before the Court in that case-where a
bare bones complaint and the burden of pre-trial discovery might effectively co-
erce an unwarranted settlement by defendants."); Dobyns v. United States, 91 Fed.
Cl. 412, 425 (2010) ("[W]hile recognizing that Iqbalmakes clear that the new stan-
dard applies to all civil cases, these cases hint at the prospect that the standard
might resonate differently depending upon the legal and factual scenario encoun-
tered."); see also Hartnett, supra note 88, at 496 ("A requirement of plausibility will,
however, apply differently in different substantive areas of the law and in different
factual situations-it will depend on what facts the substantive law makes material
and on the appropriate inferential connections between facts."); Scheindlin, supra
note 87, at 1375 ("A corollary to the pleading topic is a recurring proposal for
treating some cases differently than others. There have been proposals to track
cases as simple, average and complex and to develop different sets of rules for each
category. Until now, these proposals have died on the vine, but they are again
being proposed, partly in response to the stunning change in pleading
requirements.").
[Vol. 56: p. 857890
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ofjudicial experience by federal courts to develop presumptive rules and a
hierarchy of standards for restraint of trade cases in the antitrust field.16 0
For example, when judicial experience permits a court to recognize a par-
ticular restraint as fitting into a paradigmatic or archetypal class of re-
straints, then the court conclusively presumes that the restraint is
"unreasonable without inquiry into the particular market context in which
it is found."1 6'
Per se analysis examines whether prior judicial experience with
the type of restraint at issue is sufficient to allow a determination
that it would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output. The focus of the inquiry is on accumulated
data from prior decisions: an agreement may be declared unlaw-
ful with no further analysis, simply by virtue of its being of a type
that courts have previously determined to have "manifestly an-
ticompetitive effects," and no "redeeming virtue."162
In other words, where the courts (collectively) have sufficient experi-
ence with a particular claim and factual scenario, the courts refuse to per-
mit the defendant to establish that the reality of the situation was uniquely
different-that there was in fact healthy competition.163 By contrast,
where the courts lack such judicial experience, they permit the defendant
to prove that highly suspicious conduct is permissible despite the courts'
skepticism.164
The development of a hierarchy of pleading requirements is not a
new concept.165 Prior to the Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal opinions,
160. See Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Re/lections on Twombly
and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 187, 197-99.
161. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
162. California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
163. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010)
("Judicial experience has shown that some classes of restraints have redeeming
competitive benefits so rarely that their condemnation does not require applica-
tion of the full-fledged rule of reason."); see also id. at 318 n.14 ("In applying per se
or quick look analysis, courts make judgments based on judicial experience with
certain types of restraints and market contexts, without demanding such extensive
inquiry into the market in which the specific restraint at issue operates." (citing
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999))); United States v. Brown Univ.,
5 F.3d 658, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Per se rules of illegality are judicial constructs and
are based in large part on economic predictions that certain types of activity will
more often than not unreasonably restrain competition." (citations omitted)).
164. See Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 317 ("Some restraints of trade are 'highly
suspicious' yet 'sufficiently idiosyncratic that judicial experience with them is lim-
ited.'" (quoting 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRusT LAw 1 1911a (2d ed. 2005))).
165. Professor Christopher Fairman has written that notice pleading is a
myth-that courts have always applied heightened pleading standards to certain
types of claims. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L.
REv. 987, 998-1011 (2003) (describing different categories of claims for which
891
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the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the Rules Committee) undertook to
evaluate the extent to which some courts were applying heightened plead-
ing in certain cases.16 6 The Rules Committee also considered how the
Rules might be modified to accommodate heightened pleading:
"Fact" pleading might be restored, abandoning the 1938 experi-
ment with what is commonly called "notice" pleading. Or Rule 8
might be amended to give teeth to the requirement that the
plain and simple statement show that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Or specific rules might be adopted for specific claims, in
the mode of Rule 9(b). Or, failing any general approach, an at-
tempt might be made to reinvigorate Rule 12(e), moving it back
toward the former bill of particulars.16 7
Judge Rosenthal has indicated that the Rules Committee is currently
reevaluating the pleading standard in Rule 8 and assessing whether the
Supreme Court's rulings in Twombly and Iqbal require modifications to that
standard.1 6 8 "If the problem is the application of the standard in certain
kinds of cases or to certain kinds of litigants, that may call for a rule ap-
proach that is similar to Rule 9, using different pleading standards for
certain kinds of cases."1 6 9
VIII. PRINCIPLES FOR APPLICATION OF THE NEW PLEADING STANDARDS
Given the Supreme Court's intended meaning and application of ju-
dicial experience, district courts must apply the following principles and
conventions when resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to the new
pleading standards:
courts have applied heightened pleading standard, such as antitrust, civil RICO,
and defamation claims).
166. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes 37 (May 22-23, 2006) [here-
inafter Rules Committee Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf.
167. Id.
168. See Rosenthal, supra note 89, at 1546.
169. Id.
[Vol. 56: p. 857892
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- The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still employ a liberal
pleading standard, 170 but the standard is less liberal than it
used to be.' 71
- The liberal pleading standard does not require technical skill
in crafting a complaint, but a new goal of the pleading process
is to weed out marginal cases, especially when they will be
costly to litigate. 7 2
- Even if it is possible that the plaintiff can prove some set of
facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him or
her to relief, the court must dismiss the complaint unless the
claim is plausible.17 3
170. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (stating that "when ruling
on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
569-70 (2007) (describing that requiring specific facts beyond those necessary to
start claim amounted to impermissible heightened pleading standard); see also Cor-
tes-Rivera v. Dep't. of Corr. & Rehab., 626 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting "lib-
eral pleading requirements set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8"); Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting "lib-
eral pleading philosophy of the federal rules"); Hershey v. Energy Transfer Part-
ners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 n.12 (5th Cir. 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint
for failing "to state a claim under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8").
171. For a discussion of the history of the liberal pleading standard, see supra
notes 61-78, 95-113, and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 152-69 and accompanying text; see also Bone, supra note
70, at 870 (describing stricter pleading standard in Iqbal as screening weak cases in
addition to meritless ones); Epstein, supra note 160, at 196 (discussing situations
where judgment at pleading stage reduces error and administrative costs); Darrell
A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1011 n.97 (2010) (arguing
that new pleading standards will prevent "marginal, but ultimately meritorious
case[s]" from making it past pleading stage); Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading
PersonalJurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 627, 646 (2009) (arguing that "[t]he Twombly
opinion advocates that trial courts put an end to marginal litigation 'at the point of
minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court"' (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558)); Scheindlin, supra note 87, at 1375 ("Because the Su-
preme Court perceived the extraordinary burden of expensive discovery as a rea-
son for raising the pleading bar, the suggestion has been made that fact pleading is
particularly appropriate in complex cases but unnecessary in simple or average
cases, where the cost of discovery will not be so burdensome and the same vigi-
lance in gatekeeping by judges is not required."). The courts also might adopt a
policy to be more vigilant and demanding when handling certain types of claims
that have become far more prevalent. See Marcus, supra note 42, at 446-50.
173. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178,
1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that "complaint's allegations contain insufficient
factual information to conclude that a constitutional violation is plausible, rather
than merely possible"); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2010)
(dismissing claim because "[t]he amended complaint fails to show that it is at all
plausible, rather than perhaps theoretically possible"), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1685
(2011); Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that complaint must contain enough facts "to render the legal claim plausible,
i.e., more than merely possible"); Harps v. TRW Automotive U.S., LLC, 351 F.
App'x 52, 56 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that complaints "must contain enough facts
to establish a 'plausible,' as opposed to merely a 'possible,' entitlement to relief");
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- "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to
relief."' "
174
- The plaintiffs factual allegations must be accepted as true.1 7 5
But the district court has considerable leeway in determining
what constitutes a "factual allegation."17 6
- The court should construe the complaint liberally, but it
should not draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.177
al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing complaint
because "[w]hile it is possible that these [facts] were sufficient to put [the defen-
dant] on notice . . , the non-specific allegations in the complaint regarding [the
defendant's] involvement fail to nudge the possible to the plausible, as required by
Twombly"), overruled by 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d
391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that Twombly court pronounced that "allegations
in a complaint must make entitlement to relief plausible and not merely possi-
ble"); Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof and judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Liti-
gation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1460 (2010) (explaining that after Iqbal "the
complaint must contain enough factual detail to present a plausible-and not
merely a possible-claim").
174. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted).
175. See id.; Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Morrison
v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010) (noting that courts accept
facts of complaint as true); Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983,
986-87 (2010) (holding that on motion to dismiss, courts "accept as true the fac-
tual allegations in the ... complaint").
176. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text; see also Clermont & Yeazell,
supra note 60, at 840 ("Judges will vary in finding nonconclusory allegations of a
complaint implausible after considering the specific 'context' of the case and ap-
plying 'judicial experience and common sense.'" (citation omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
177. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Scheindlin, supra note 87, at 1374 ("The
Twombly Court explicitly permits a court to consider inferences that favor the plain-
tiff as well as those that favor the defendant. This likely means that courts are now
required to weigh competing inferences and find, at the motion to dismiss stage,
that the inferences that can be drawn in plaintiffs favor are at least as strong, if not
stronger, than the inferences that can be drawn in defendant's favor."); see also
Miller, supra note 86, at 29-33; Spencer, supra note 70, at 200 (explaining that "the
Iqbal decision gave judges more power to scrutinize facts at the pleading stage");
Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215, 225 ("[In the determination of whether claims are plausible,
courts use their own opinions of the facts and examine the inferences that favor
the defendants in addition to inferences that favor the plaintiffs"); Mohan, supra
note 86, at 1201 ("[B]y relying on judicial experience and common sense, differ-
ent outcomes on similar facts are inevitable.").
[Vol. 56: p. 857894
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- The court is not limited to consideration of information stated
on the face of the complaint, judicially noticed facts, and any
attachments to the complaint.17 8 In addition, the court must
draw on its judicial experience.
- The application of judicial experience requires the district
court to reject factual allegations where the court has a better
understanding of the way the world is.' 7 9
The application of judicial experience also requires the district court
to consider prior federal court experience with similar claims and similar
claimants. Where similar claims and similar claimants have historically
been unsuccessful, the court should be more demanding in its assessment
of plausibility.18 0
IX. THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE AT THE PLEADING STAGE
Is INAPPROPRIATE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE
ADvERsARIAL NATURE OF LITIGATION
The application of judicial experience does not require a district
court to make a subjective judgment about whether the plaintiffs vision of
the world is true. Nor does it require a district court to make a subjective
judgment about the merits of a claim. Drawing on judicial experience
does require a district court to consider information beyond that alleged
in the complaint.1 a' A district court must consider the historical success
rate of similar claims and similar claimants and the views of leading ex-
perts and commentators in the relevant field of substantive law.' 8 2 Thus,
some commentators have suggested that plaintiffs should consider ap-
178. See supra notes 79-149 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 79-121, 143-51, and accompanying text.
181. See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., No. 06-104-JJF-MPT, 2010 WL 1418347, at
*3 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2010) ("'[J]udicial experience' and 'common sense' do not
permit a court to scour the record for additional facts indicating that claims are
plausible, but rather to draw on outside knowledge in determining whether the
particular facts alleged 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" (citation
omitted)).
182. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("[W]e have the
benefit of the prior rulings and considered views of leading commentators"); see
also Bone, supra note 70, at 873 ("The assessment of likely trial success that the
thick screening model requires is an all-things-considered prediction based on
what the complaint tells the judge about the facts and what the judge knows from
her experience about how facts like the ones alleged are usually proved in similar
cases."); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MIcH. L. REv. 53, 68 n.88
(2010) ("[Tlhe invitation by Iqbalfor district judges to use judicial experience and
common sense ... might also require judges to seek outside guidance on certain
technical issues of substantive law, such as antitrust law, to determine what is plau-
sible and what is not."); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86
IND. L.J. 119, 135 n.79 (2011) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950); supra notes 142-51
and accompanying text.
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pending empirical evidence or reports of experts to establish why the
claim is plausible despite contrary appearances.18 3
The application ofjudicial experience and the resultant resolution of
a motion to dismiss by reference to information outside the complaint are
inappropriate for pleading standards and inconsistent with the adversarial
process. Rule 12(d) prohibits the parties from offering evidence beyond
that set forth in the complaint in support of, or in opposition to, a motion
to dismiss:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to
present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.' 8
The Supreme Court did not address the tension between Rule 12(d)
and the application ofjudicial experience.1 85 If the parties cannot submit
additional information for the court's consideration, it is inappropriate
for the court to consider information beyond the scope of the
complaint.18 6
Rule 12(d) is consistent with due process and the adversarial nature
of litigation. The judge relies on the parties to present evidence and make
arguments. The judge does not conduct legal or factual investigation. 18 7
In the context of pleading, the "reality" of the past incident is limited to
the facts alleged in the four corners of the complaint itself-the allega-
tions made by the plaintiff and the plaintiffs view of the inferences to be
drawn from those allegations. If the court is to consider outside informa-
tion, it must give each side notice of that intention and a reasonable op-
portunity to present pertinent material and to offer argument about the
value and meaning of such information. 8 8 Where the party opposing the
motion needs time to gather evidence to respond to the motion-particu-
larly when the motion to dismiss is made before discovery occurs-the
district court ordinarily will defer or deny the motion to allow time for the
183. See Brown, supra note 82, at 172 (describing possible method for litigant
to provide empirical evidence to survive motion to dismiss); see also Hartnett, supra
note 88, at 503 ("[P]erhaps Twombly suggests that litigants seek directly to under-
mine [a judge's] baseline assumption [about what is reasonable] with social sci-
ence research.").
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
185. See Noll, supra note 76, at 137.
186. See, e.g., Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that trial court's decision to sua sponte convert motion to dismiss into motion
for summary judgment is "serious error"), abrogated by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
187. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
188. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d); David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding lower court erred when granting summary judgment
motion without further notice to parties).
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opposing party to conduct discovery, offer relevant evidence, and prepare
pertinent legal argument.18 9
The application of judicial experience to consider information
outside the pleadings is inconsistent with the adversarial proceSS.190 The
claimant will be left in the dark about the information sought out and
considered by the court and will not have a chance to test and oppose
such information for relevance, reliability, and biases against the crucible
of cross-examination and the other evidentiary mechanisms and litigation
processes that are consistent with the adversarial process.19 1 As Professor
Darrel A.H. Miller states:
Where Iqbal goes wrong is in its articulation of a standard that
seems to privilege experience, without demanding impartiality.
Iqbal seems to invite judges to determine plausibility based upon
their own experience, rather than forcing them to do the hard
work to imagine themselves in the scenario presented within the
four corners of the complaint. 'Judicial experience" in opera-
tion looks too much like "my experience." And "my experience"
may or may not include the experience of the litigants.' 9 2
Twombly and Iqbal now permit a district court judge to go beyond the
universe of facts created by the plaintiff to determine whether the plain-
tiffs allegations convince the court that plaintiffs claim is plausible. It is
unfair and improper to resolve a dispute on grounds which the parties had
no chance to contest and offer evidence and argument.1 9 3
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56(d); see, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football
League, 720 F.2d 772, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that requests for continu-
ance should be granted "almost as a matter of course" when party opposing mo-
tion can point to discovery it needs to obtain evidence from moving party);
Hawkins v. Donovan, 269 F.R.D. 6, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that evidence
presented sufficiently demonstrated that plaintiff was entitled to discovery before
litigating on merits of claim).
190. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 60, at 832 ("The new approach does
not comfortably mesh, but rather clashes, with the prior procedural system, which
of course magnifies the destabilizing effect that comes from cutting a procedural
system from its moorings.").
191. Margaret L. Moses, Beyond judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court Is No
Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161, 202 (2011) (arguing that allowingjudges
to "reach[ ] out for issues not put before [the court] by the parties . . . denie[s]
parties the right to a full and fair process").
192. Miller, supra note 172, at 1011-12.
193. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1941); see also Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989) ("Under Rule 12(b) (6), a plaintiff with an
arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the
motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying
the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing
the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as
to conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action. This adversarial
process also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a
897
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Consideration of information beyond that alleged in the complaint,
even where it calls for a purely objective determination, also permits trial
courts a significant amount of discretion. 19 4 This grant of discretion is
inappropriate because it requires the district courts to make complex and
important policy decisions that are normally left to the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches. 1 9 5 Drawing lines and creating a hierarchy of pleading
standards requires "detailed knowledge about the underlying substantive
law and the practicalities of litigating claims arising under that law."196
Trial courts are not the appropriate body to make such public policy deci-
sions, particularly because these important judgments will be imple-
mented by hundreds of judges faced with thousands of cases, most of
which are unique. Few cases (maybe none) will permit individual judges
to immerse themselves in the underlying substantive law and the policy
choices that helped define this law-especially, as the Supreme Court de-
mands, at the pleading stage.1 97
Finally, the expansion of the trial court's discretionary powers is a
one-way ratchet at the pleading stage; the Supreme Court was not inviting
the application of more lax pleading standards. The Court intends the
exercise ofjudicial discretion to result in dismissal of a greater number of
cases.19 8 This problem was specifically identified by the Rules Committee
when it considered the task of creating a hierarchy of "claim-specific
trial court dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case." (footnote
omitted)).
194. See Martin v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 627, 632 (2011) ("The Supreme
Court expressly afforded trial courts discretion in ascertaining whether a plaintiff
has alleged a plausible claim, urging trial courts to 'draw upon [their] judicial
experience and common sense.' (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009))); Kenneth S. Klein, In Discretion: The Conse-
quences ofTwombly and Iqbal, PRETRIAL PRACTICE & DiscovkRy (ABA Sec. on Litig.)
Fall 2010, at 22 ("[T]he Court has signaled a grant of super-discretion to the trial
courts.").
195. See Noll, supra note 76, at 139-40; Klein, supra note 194, at 22.
196. See Rules Committee Minutes, supra note 166, at 38; see also Anderson &
Huffman, supra note 32, at 28 ("Each element of each claim in each area of sub-
stantive law needs to be examined to assess whether the high plausibility standard
applied in Twombly and Iqbal is justified.").
197. See Bone, supra note 70; Klein, supra note 194, at 22; see also Noll, supra
note 76, at 139-40 ("More broadly, increased use ofjudgmental facts increases the
power ofjudges vis-A-vis Congress, the Executive Branch, and the agencies to deter-
mine the kind of cases that receive a hearing in federal court. As Iqbal pointedly
illustrates, a court's reliance on judgmental facts can directly affect whether partic-
ular forms of primary conduct support a federal suit designed to test the legality of
that conduct. To the extent judges define and shape judgmental facts, they exer-
cise a power which is not easily distinguished from the legislative power to define
norms of substantive law.").
198. See Bone, supra note 70, at 870; Noll, supra note 76, at 149 ("The fact that
the Supreme Court dismissed two complaints, including a complaint seven federal
judges found sufficient, indicates a new willingness to decide cases on the plead-
ings, and the analysis here ignores the signaling effect of this exercise of judicial
power by the Nation's highest court.").
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pleading rules." The committee warned about the "perception that the
seemingly procedural pleading rules are surreptitiously motivated by dis-
taste for the substantive rights or defenses subjected to higher
standards."1 99
X. CONCLUSION
Professors Yeazell and Clermont assert "that by blazing a new and un-
clear path alone and without adequate warning or thought [the Supreme
Court] left the pleading system in shambles."20 0 Arguing that Twombly
and Iqbal destabilized the federal pleading regime, they assert that one
cause of that destabilization was the addition of the new plausibility stan-
dard, an imprecise term that has not yet been defined satisfactorily. As
this Article demonstrates, another cause of that destabilization was the ad-
dition of the new requirement that district courts apply judicial experi-
ence to resolve motions to dismiss.
In this Article, I describe the meaning of "judicial experience" that
the Supreme Court intends. The Supreme Court believes that the system
of litigation must be protected from cases that are not meritless, but are
deemed objectively unworthy. To save the system, the Court wants to de-
velop rules and standards that will restrict the number of cases that survive
a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore has tasked federal courts with
development of a common law of federal pleading. The Court proclaims
that this new regime does not require "heightened fact pleading of specif-
ics." Instead, the Court offers a universal plausibility standard applicable
to all civil actions. But the meaning of plausibility is context-specific and
dependent upon judicial experience with similar claims and claimants.
If I am correct in ascertaining the meaning that the Supreme Court
ascribes to judicial experience, then the development of a common law of
federal pleading will require district court judges to change their tradi-
tional role in the adversarial process and become active players in the
game of litigation. They must independently investigate and make judg-
ments about the accuracy, reasonableness, and truth of the picture of real-
ity painted by a claimant in a complaint. They also must prejudge each
action. Based on objective judicial experience and the views of experts
and commentators regarding the chances for success, district courts will
disfavor certain types of claims and certain types of claimants and defend-
ants. They will then employ a more rigorous pleading standard to weed
out dubious claims. The Court explicitly rejects heightened fact pleading
of specifics, but invites district courts to set the bar of plausibility at differ-
ent heights based on judicial experience.
In the Introduction, I quoted Chief Justice Roberts's now-famous
statement that ajudge's job is to "call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or
199. Rules Committee Minutes, supra note 166, at 38.
200. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 60, at 823.
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bat."20 1 I then noted that the Supreme Court has asked district courts to
suit up and get in the game. Continuing with the baseball theme, maybe a
better analogy is that the Supreme Court wants federal district courts to
act less like an umpire and more like representatives of the commis-
sioner's office. The intended application of judicial experience requires
the federal courts to employ the rules in a more stringent fashion against
the objectively weaker team to protect against a "lucky" upset that is bad
for the larger, long-term interests of baseball. The players and the public
should cry foul.
201. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 56. .
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